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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050043-3

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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26 OCT 1972

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In Communist Propaganda

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26 OCTOBER 1972

75R000300050043,3NO. 43)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 OCTOBER 1972

Moscow (2758 items)

Indochina	(10%)	12%
[International	(1%)	8%]
Solidarity Week		
Tashkent International	(--)	9%
Conference on Socialist		
Transformation		
Egyptian Premier	(0.1%)	5%
Sidqi in USSR		
October Revolution	(3%)	5%
Anniversary		
China	(4%)	4%

Peking (1366 items)

Domestic Issues	(36%)	41%
Indochina	(20%)	28%
[Vietnam	(6%)	16%]
[Cambodia	(2%)	7%]
[Laos	(2%)	5%]
UNGA Session	(8%)	9%
PRC-Maldives	(--)	4%
Diplomatic Relations		
Somali Revolution	(--)	3%
Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi radio's release of the 26 October DRV Government statement revealing the draft agreement on a Vietnam settlement negotiated by North Vietnam and the United States came some 11 hours after a VNA commentary, pegged to President Thieu's TV speech of the 24th, had made Hanoi's first explicit mention of the recent private talks in Paris and Kissinger's numerous meetings with Thieu in Saigon. Hanoi's comment on Thieu's speech, along with other recent propaganda, held the United States responsible for his intransigence and thus laid the groundwork for the charge in the government statement that the United States is using "so-called difficulties in Saigon" as a pretext to delay implementation of the agreement. The statement said that the DRV "strongly denounces the Nixon Administration's lack of goodwill and seriousness" and "firmly demands" that the United States fulfill its commitments and sign the peace agreement on 31 October.

The bulk of recent Hanoi and Front propaganda has routinely pictured the Vietnamese as desiring a peaceful settlement but determined to continue the struggle against "intensified aggression" in both the North and the South. Continuing attacks on alleged acts of repression by the Thieu regime include Front comment pegged to a 14 October statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman accusing the Saigon administration of massacring prisoners.

Peking has continued to refrain from discussing a Vietnam settlement and, consistent with its usual reaction time, has yet to respond to the DRV Government statement. However, Peking appeared concerned to show its support for Vietnamese communist efforts to discredit the Thieu government when a 24 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article belatedly endorsed the PRG statement on Saigon's alleged massacre of prisoners.

TASS promptly carried a brief report of the DRV Government statement on a peace agreement, noting Hanoi's insistence that it be signed on 31 October. Unlike Hanoi media, Moscow had carried several brief reports on Kissinger's talks in Saigon, citing Western press speculation linking his travels with the Paris negotiations and reporting Thieu's opposition to a coalition government. Moscow, however, had avoided comment on rumors regarding a peace breakthrough.

DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT REVEALS TEXT OF DRAFT PEACE AGREEMENT

In revealing the scenario of the private U.S.-DRV negotiations since 8 October and the text of a draft agreement, the DRV Government

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statement said that this information "is in the interest of peace and will in no way affect the negotiations, the two parties having agreed upon the text of the agreement and the schedule for its signing." It added that the DRV "strictly holds" to the understanding that there will be no changes in the agreed text of the agreement and that it should be signed on 31 October. The statement divulged that the first timetable had been set on 9 October when it was agreed that U.S. bombing and mining of North Vietnam would cease on the 18th, with initialing of the text of the peace agreement in Hanoi on the 19th and the signing in Paris on the 26th. It said the United States had on two occasions proposed new schedules, having finally suggested on 20 October that the formal signing should be on the 31st. But on the 23d, the statement added, the United States again referred to "difficulties in Saigon" and "demanded that the negotiations be continued for resolving new problems and did not say anything about the implementation of its commitments under the agreed schedule."

The government statement termed the "so-called difficulties in Saigon" merely a pretext to delay implementation of the U.S. commitments since, it claimed, "everyone knows that the Saigon administration was set up and fostered by the United States." The statement charged that the latest developments show that the Nixon Administration is not negotiating with a serious attitude and goodwill, and that in fact it is dragging out the talks in an effort to deceive public opinion and cover up its scheme of maintaining the Saigon puppet administration "in order to prolong its war of aggression in Vietnam and Indochina."

Such charges regarding U.S. support of Thieu have been a continuing staple of Hanoi propaganda and were repeated vehemently in comment on President Thieu's TV speech delivered on 24 October following Kissinger's five-day stay in Saigon. The first brief mention of Thieu's speech, in a Hanoi radio broadcast in Mandarin on the 25th, posed the question: "Is Nixon, while expressing sincerity about peace and about pursuing the path of finding a solution through negotiations, trying his utmost to protect Thieu, an obstacle to finding a settlement to the Vietnam problem?" The broadcast concluded that given its support for Thieu, the U.S. Government must be held responsible for the obstacles to the negotiations and for the prolongation of the war.

A similar line had been taken in a 14 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article pegged to a 12 October speech in which Thieu had also

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opposed the idea of a coalition government.* The army paper charged that President Nixon was trying to create the false impression that the Administration wanted to reach a solution but had met opposition from Thieu. The timing of this article was notable, appearing on the heels of the intensive four-day talks in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho during which, the government statement now makes clear, U.S.-DRV agreement was reached on the draft peace accord. In addition, as the government statement has now revealed, the article in the army paper came three days after the first U.S. proposal--on the 11th--of a revised schedule regarding the initialing and signing of the agreement.

The pattern of Hanoi media's behavior during the past few days has provided a classic example of careful orchestration. It has been clear that Hanoi was unwilling to give any hint to its domestic audience about the private negotiations in advance of the presentation of its official record. Thus, Hanoi's first clear allusion to recent private talks appeared in the 25 October Mandarin-language broadcast on Thieu's TV speech. The broadcast preceded its rhetorical question on President Nixon's behavior regarding Thieu with the statement that "public opinion feels that at a time when people are closely following the diplomatic activities aimed at peacefully settling the Vietnam question, Thieu's obstinate attitude and bellicose clamorings raise many doubts."* This passage occurred verbatim in a broadcast in English to Southeast Asia but was not repeated in a commentary broadcast to Vietnamese audiences the same day. Hanoi's explicit mention of the private talks in Paris and Kissinger's meetings in Saigon came in a VNA commentary on Thieu's speech transmitted in the news agency's international service in English.

The VNA commentary said that Thieu, in coming out vituperatively against the restoration of peace and against national concord,

* See the TRENDS of 18 October 1972, pages 1-2.

** Somewhat surprisingly, a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 21st had alluded to Kissinger's visit. It cited AFP for the report that Thieu on the 19th--in addition to meetings with legislative, judicial, and political representatives--had conducted "a very important meeting, unprecedented in the history of the second republic, with a very important U.S. delegation at Independence Palace."

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showed first of all that he is frightened by worldwide public comments on "the recent negotiations in Paris between the representatives of the DRV and the American side, which point to the Vietnamese people's goodwill and seriousness." Observing that many people have asked of Thieu's behavior "how can the tail wag the dog?", VNA said his "powder-smelling statements at a time when both Nixon and Kissinger remained muted after six meetings between the President's special envoy and Thieu . . . can only reveal the real intention of Thieu's boss." VNA went on to say that Thieu's "arrogant" attitude can only mean that Mr. Nixon has not actually made up his mind to abandon Thieu, and instead is "still trying to use him in his political game now that the election is drawing near."

There is other evidence that while Hanoi was willing to allude to some speculation about private negotiations in comment for audiences abroad, it was reluctant to broach the matter to its domestic audience. Thus, VNA's international transmissions on 24 October reported cryptically that the press bureau of the DRV Embassy in Peking had issued an authorized statement on the 23d describing as "sheer fabrication" REUTER's report that North Vietnamese diplomats in Peking said on the 21st that "a major development was possible in the next two or three days" about such questions as "the lot of Nguyen Van Thieu." Hanoi media have also remained silent on Pham Van Dong's recent interviews with NEWSWEEK and other Western publications.

While generally avoiding acknowledgment of specific speculation about the status of negotiations in its domestic propaganda, Hanoi had sustained the practice--initiated in August--of challenging U.S. expressions of optimism.* Thus, a 25 October NHAN DAN editorial on U.S. air strikes, transmitted by VNA some two hours after the first reaction to Thieu's TV speech, declared: "Certain people in Washington have for some time now tried to make believe that the war is coming to an end. The fact, however, is that the forces of aggression there are continuing the intensification of the war, perpetrating more crimes every day in both zones of Vietnam." As an example, the

* This propaganda included the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article which presented a comprehensive review of the communists' negotiating position, but started out by attacking U.S. expressions of optimism under the heading "Tricks That Can Deceive No One." See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6.

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editorial added that on 11 October when the U.S. side was speaking of progress, U.S. aircraft had struck Hanoi, killing many civilians and damaging foreign diplomatic missions. It went on to detail strikes in both the North and the South and concluded with the routine pledge that the struggle would be continued no matter how difficult the road. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 24th, pegged to alleged U.S. intensification of the bombing of civilians in the North, had also spoken of the Nixon "clique" resorting to "all sorts of tricks to create a fraudulent peace smokescreen." It charged further that the "clique" has also adopted the trick of "letting its lackey Nguyen Van Thieu voice its warlike and stubborn position on its behalf" but added that "this shrewd maneuver certainly will not deceive the public."

Earlier propaganda castigating U.S. support for Thieu included a 21 October commentary broadcast in English to Southeast Asia which again assailed Thieu for declaring in his 12 October speech that all those who supported a national concord government and all communists should be killed. The commentary charged that Thieu's "fire eating" simply reflects U.S. scheming to prolong the war through Vietnamization--which, it noted, means brother fighting brother. After lauding the PRG's proposal for a three-segment government, it said that "Thieu has turned out to be the main obstacle to national concord and peace. Yet Nixon has tried to retain him as a tool of U.S. colonialism."

The "repressive" policies of the Thieu regime have continued to be the target of communist criticism, and Front media have also sought to undercut Saigon contentions that the communists plan to carry out reprisals against the population. Thus, an authorized LPA statement on the 25th "resolutely rejected" the "completely fabricated story" that the GVN had seized a Viet Cong plan for sentencing to death some 23 categories of people. The matter of "so-called Viet Cong death lists" had been ridiculed as early as last 24 June in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article.

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HANOI ROUTINELY PROTESTS CONTINUED U.S. AIR STRIKES IN DRV

In addition to the NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th and the Hanoi radio commentary of the 24th, cited above, which attacked the Nixon Administration for spreading rumors of progress in negotiations, the daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman protesting U.S. strikes during the past week have said that the Nixon Administration is revealing its "false allegations about peace and goodwill" by continuing the bombing of the North. The spokesman's statement of the 26th, for example, forcefully asserted that the Administration is attempting to deceive world public opinion by "ballyhooing incessantly that it will end the war and that it is negotiating seriously to solve the Vietnam problem" while actually continuing to send U.S. planes to bomb and strafe "many municipalities, cities, towns, and population centers of the DRV." The statement called the continuing U.S. raids "criminal war acts" which "prove that the United States does not have a serious attitude and goodwill for negotiation aimed at ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam." A NHAN DAN editorial of 22 October also lashed out at the United States for "saying it wants peace" while "stepping up its war efforts and intensifying the bombing and strafing of North Vietnam." After detailing alleged U.S. attacks from 18 to 21 October on 15 DRV provinces, the editorial assailed the "U.S. imperialists" for "continuing to intensify the war in defiance of the American people and world public opinion."

In an editorial the previous day, NHAN DAN had claimed that world public opinion "demands that the United States immediately end all bombings and strafings of Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and towns." NHAN DAN then singled out recent gestures of support from officials of several cities within the USSR and the PRC--in response to the 3 October appeal by 37 DRV mayors--to bolster its claim of worldwide public demand for the United States to stop its bombing of the North. The paper delivered a scathing attack on the Nixon Administration for allegedly attempting to save its "Vietnamization strategy" by putting Hanoi, Haiphong, economic installations, schools, hospitals, churches, and crowded city wards, "including the diplomatic corps district in Hanoi," on the list of "strategic targets" of the U.S. air force. It went on to call for increased vigilance and improved air defense work in order to meet the threat of "aggressive U.S. imperialists," who were pictured as remaining "very bellicose and stubborn, unwilling to give up their aggressive design."

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The Administration came under additional fire in an appeal issued by the minister of education, the minister of higher and secondary professional education, and the education workers trade union at a 19 October Hanoi press conference. The appeal called on teachers and students throughout the world to help "stay the bloody hands of Nixon, prevent him from killing teachers and pupils and destroying schools in the DRV." Claiming that more than 200 schools have been demolished and that "hundreds of teachers and pupils have been massacred" since the April escalation, the appeal condemned the Administration for "grossly trampling on all international law and on all norms of morality and civilization, as well as on the dignity and conscience of all mankind."

In a similar appeal, publicized by VNA on the 20th, the rectors of 37 universities and colleges and the directors of 200 secondary schools in the DRV developed the charge that the President, by making use of the latest achievements of science and technology "to kill and maim Vietnamese teachers and students," had "outstripped the war crimes of his predecessor Hitler."

The claimed downing of the 4,000th U.S. plane over the North on the 17th received editorial acclaim in NHAN DAN on the 19th and 22d as well as in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 19th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial argued that the downing of the 4,000th plane demonstrated that the "myths about the 'incredible' U.S. air power" have been destroyed and that "we are winning, whereas the Americans are defeated." As of 26 October, Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 4,017 U.S. aircraft over the North.

HANOI PAPER REITERATES CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY SITUATION

Amid Western speculation about diplomatic moves to end the Vietnam war, an article published in installments in NHAN DAN from 21 to 23 October served to reinforce Hanoi's previous expressions of confidence that the communists can pursue a military course to victory. The article, attributed to Tran Kien* and entitled "Four Years of Maneuvers and Failures," was also

* NHAN DAN published a similar series of articles on the war in South Vietnam by Tran Kien in June 1968, and on 10 November 1970 the paper identified a Tran Kien as a member of NHAN DAN's editorial board.

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publicized by Hanoi radio. It reviewed the fighting over the past four years and labeled as "strategic failures" the allied incursion into Cambodia in 1970, the ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia in 1971, efforts to halt support for the communists in the South, Vietamization, and the recent "re-Americanization" of the war.

Tran Kien repeated standard DRV evaluations of the military situation which had been developed previously--for example, in the reports on the 20th VWP plenum earlier this year.* Thus he maintained that the fighting in 1971 demonstrated the ability of the communists' regular forces to "launch large-scale annihilating battles" and made it clear that "our people's armed forces in the South were definitely able to annihilate the puppet regular forces and to defeat the Vietnamization strategy militarily." He also repeated the evaluation, stressed by Hanoi prior to this year's offensive, that the communist forces were in a "victorious, active, advantageous, ascending position." The launching of the offensive, he said, reflected the favorable balance of forces on the battlefield.

The article concluded with the affirmation that "the resistance has scored successes of very important strategic significance, is in a situation more excellent than ever before, and is facing extremely brilliant prospects. Persisting in and stepping up the fighting, we will certainly score complete success."

* For background on the plenum and on previous Hanoi discussions of the military situation, see the 12 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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MOSCOW REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' POSITION

Moscow has originated no substantial comment on a Vietnam settlement. It has continued, however, to report Vietnamese communist statements, with TASS' prompt, brief report of the DRV Government statement on a peace agreement taking note of Hanoi's insistence that the agreement be signed on 31 October. Earlier statements picked up by Moscow had included the one by DRV Paris press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le on the 23d saying that "at present there are all conditions for a speedy settlement" but that "everything now depends on the United States." TASS and Moscow radio typically carried several brief reports of Kissinger's talks in Saigon and Phnom Penh, citing Western press speculation linking his travels with the Paris talks and reporting Thieu's opposition to a coalition government.

Kosygin offered the usual generalized support for the Vietnamese in remarks at a 24 October dinner for the visiting Italian prime minister. According to a TASS summary, he merely expressed support for the PRG and DRV proposals, which he described as "offering a political platform for a fair settlement in Vietnam."

Moscow has been observing at a low level an "international week of solidarity with the peoples of Indochina" which it says was called for by the Executive Committee of the Stockholm Conference. The publicity, including reports of low-level meetings and statements by public organizations, repeats stock expressions of Soviet support and assistance for the Vietnamese people's struggle. A Moscow public meeting, reported by TASS on 18 October, was attended by the DRV and PRG ambassadors.

There are no available reports that any Soviet leaders have recently received DRV and PRG ambassadors. But on 19 October the media of several East European countries reported that party leaders in those countries had received DRV and PRG envoys. Prague said General Secretary Husak received the DRV ambassador "at the latter's request" and assured him of Czechoslovak support for the DRV stand on a peaceful settlement. East Berlin reported that Politburo member Aven received the DRV and PRG ambassadors for a talk about questions of the Vietnamese people's struggle and "the results achieved in this connection in the military, political, and diplomatic fields." Bucharest reported that General Secretary Ceausescu received DRV and PRG envoys "at their request" but did not indicate the substance of the talks. Warsaw reported without elaboration that First Secretary Gierek received the DRV ambassador. Leaders in Prague and Belgrade have also received the credentials of newly appointed PRG ambassadors.

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PEKING VILIFIES THIEU REGIME, AVOIDS NEGOTIATIONS ISSUE

Consistent with its usual reaction time, Peking has yet to respond to the 26 October DRV Government statement and has continued to refrain from discussing the negotiations on a Vietnam settlement. However, a 24 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article strongly assailing the Thieu regime appeared aimed at showing Chinese support for Vietnamese communist efforts to discredit and undermine the political standing of the Thieu government. The timing of the Commentator article--coming 10 days after the 14 October PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, on an alleged GVN prison "massacre," which it purported to endorse--may be related to the conclusion of Kissinger's talks with Thieu in Saigon. Peking does not as a rule offer such authoritative backing for the spokesman's statements and has not recently voiced a comparable attack on Thieu.*

Commentator denounced the Thieu government for serving as a "criminal tool of U.S. imperialism," establishing a "military, fascist rule" in the South, and owing the Vietnamese people "uncountable blood debts." He went on to hail the recent "spectacular victories" in South Vietnam that had left the Thieu government "more tottering," and predicted its "doomed defeat" along with the U.S. aggressors. Consistent with Peking's low posture on the Vietnam negotiations, Commentator did not refer to the question of political settlement. Peking's only recent references to peace negotiations have been in two pickups of Vietnamese comment. NCNA on 24 October replayed in full a brief VNA report of remarks on the 23d by the DRV spokesman in Paris who claimed that a quick settlement is possible provided the Nixon Administration negotiates seriously. A 25 October NCNA account of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials of that day cited the assertion that there is a contradiction between American claims of progress in the negotiations and continued U.S. bombing raids in Vietnam, but it predictably dropped direct criticism of the Nixon Administration.

A PRC Defense Ministry message of 19 October congratulating the North Vietnamese on the alleged downing of the 4000th U.S. plane

* The 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the Geneva accords anniversary branded the Saigon government as "utterly illegal" and "long spurned by the South Vietnamese people," and demanded an end to U.S. support for the Thieu "puppet clique."

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over the North offers standard support for the Vietnamese war effort. (The PRC Defense Ministry had also sent a message following the 3000th downing in 1968.) The message used stock language to assail U.S. bombing raids and interdiction efforts against the North, and derided Washington's attempt to force the Vietnamese people to submit. It promised that Peking would do its utmost to give "all-round support" so long as the war continues.

PATHET LAO PRESENTS DETAILED PEACE PROPOSAL IN VIENTIANE

Substantive political talks between the RLG and the NLHS on a Lao settlement began in Vientiane on 17 October with the presentation of a detailed negotiating position by the NLHS representative, Phoune Sipraseuth, at the first meeting of delegations of the two sides.* Vientiane radio reported that it was agreed to meet every Tuesday, with extra weekly meetings if necessary, and that the NLHS five-point proposal of March 1970 and the additional proposal of the government side would be considered.

The talks came about as a result of correspondence between Lao Premier Souvanna Phouma and NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong which was resumed in July after an interruption of several months in the two-year-old negotiations.** In a 24 July message following up initial renewed correspondence, Souvanna Phouma told Souphanouvong that his side was willing to consider the NLHS five-point proposal as a basis for discussion. After further exchanges and talks between "plenipotentiary representatives" of both princes on technical details, the NLHS delegation arrived in Vientiane on 14 October. Both delegations are led by experienced negotiators: The Pathet Lao's chief delegate is Phoune Sipraseuth, member of the Standing Committee of the NLHS

* While Vientiane media say that the delegations represent the RLG and the NLHS, the Pathet Lao comment consistently calls the government group the "Vientiane side delegation." The sides have apparently decided not to make an issue of nomenclature, however.

** The reopening of the contacts and background are discussed in the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 20-22.

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Central Committee, who had also been Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary in the abortive negotiations in 1970; the government's is led by Pheng Phongsavan, who played a like role in 1970. The importance which the NLHS apparently ascribes to the talks was reflected in the announcement, carried by the Pathet Lao radio on 25 October, that the high-ranking Phoumi Vongvichit, NLHS Secretary General, has been appointed "special adviser" to the delegation in Vientiane.

OPENING SESSION In his speech in the opening session of the talks on 17 October Phoune Sipraseuth reviewed what he called the "main contents" of the March 1970 five-point proposal, in fact elaborating and recasting it and thus setting forth a detailed bargaining position. The new stand is notable for its elaboration of procedures for the formation of a new provisional government, detailed discussion of demands for U.S. and allied withdrawals, and new proposals on a cease-fire and prisoner exchange. By sending a delegation to Vientiane to carry on what apparently are to be serious negotiations, the NLHS has demonstrated its willingness to talk without the precondition of a U.S. bombing halt--an issue over which the princes' negotiations had foundered in previous years. Phoune Sipraseuth's elaboration of the five points thus omitted the NLHS' former demand that the United States unconditionally halt the bombing to "create conditions" for the Lao parties concerned to meet and settle the Lao problem, although he did insist that the bombing be stopped as part of the cease-fire in order to "implement" the agreements reached.

The Pathet Lao's willingness to talk while bombings continue parallels that of the Vietnamese communists in Paris, and some aspects of the new proposals call to mind the PRG stand elaborated on 11 September. Phoune Sipraseuth emphasized that the new five points "constitute an organic, indivisible whole" aimed at settlement of internal and external, political and military aspects of the Lao problem--a stand consistent with the Vietnamese communist position at Paris that military and political questions cannot be separated.

Although Phoune Sipraseuth's speech included a lengthy diatribe against U.S. "aggression" and contained a detailed, hardline set of proposals, other aspects of the speech suggested that these elements may be intended as an opening bargaining position. The speech did not echo the March 1970 rhetoric on friendship with the DRV, PRG, and Cambodia; instead it placed greater stress on the notion of Lao independence.

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+ Point one, like the first point in the 1970 document, deals with a halt to U.S. "aggression" and withdrawal, going into much more detail than the earlier proposal. Demanding that the United States cease its bombardments and all other military operations, it echoes the 1970 point in calling for withdrawal of U.S. military advisers and personnel but adds a demand for the withdrawal of "technical personnel" of the United States and other countries, apparently paralleling the 11 September demand by the South Vietnamese PRG. It also adds demands for the dissolution of all military and paramilitary organizations set up by the United States in Laos and for the dismantling of all U.S. and Thai bases in Laos. It stipulates that the United States must bear the cost of war damages, where the 1970 proposal had demanded this of "the pro-American forces."

+ Point two, as in 1970, deals with the international aspects of a settlement. Repeating the proviso that Laos must refrain from joining any military alliance, it now specifies SEATO. To the 1970 demand that Laos must not allow "foreign countries" to introduce troops and military personnel, it adds a proscription of weapons, ammunition, and war materiel. The passage referring to "foreign countries" is the only one in the program that could be read as alluding to the DRV presence as well as that of the United States.

While the 1970 point two called upon Laos to establish friendly relations with the other Indochinese countries, specifying the DRV, PRG, and Cambodia, the current point merely refers to friendly relations with Indochinese neighbors in general and includes the formula that relations must be based on a "common effort to defend their respective lands and build them in their own ways." It emphasizes that relations with the Indochinese neighbors must be based on equality and respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Unlike the 1970 version, it specifies the United States when noting Lao willingness to accept foreign aid without strings.

+ Point three deals with the formation of a provisional coalition government in more far-reaching detail than did its counterpart in 1970, when the issue was covered in more generalized terms in points three and four. The 1970 proposal envisaged general elections to elect a national assembly and set up a "democratic government of national union." It further proposed that in "the period from the restoration of peace to the general elections," the "parties concerned" hold a "consultative political conference"

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to set up a "provisional coalition government." The current point calls for amendments and revisions to the constitution and electoral law, as well as elections for a national assembly and the formation of an "official coalition government." It stipulates that for the "immediate future," a "provisional national coalition government" and "a political consultative council" should be set up, the provisional coalition government to be composed of three equal segments: the NLHS; the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF) and "personalities and intellectuals advocating peace, independence, and neutrality"; and the "Vientiane party." The point thus implies that the NLHS and its PNF allies have status equal to that of Souvanna Phouma's government, and it further reflects the NLHS' stock propaganda charge of the last few years that Souvanna Phouma has lost his neutralist status and sided with the rightists.

+ Points four and five of the new program cover implementation of a cease-fire in much more detail than did the former point five. Like the 1970 program, they stress that the parties should refrain from discrimination or retaliation against people who have been cooperating with the other party, and they demand that Vientiane repatriate refugees and compensate them. The new point four adds a call for free movement and exchanges between the two zones in order to promptly reunify the country. The demand in the former point five that "no party use force to encroach upon or nibble at the areas controlled by another," coupled with the demand that "the pro-American forces withdraw from the areas they have illegally occupied," is now expanded to include proposals for a cease-fire and a U.S. bombing halt. The new point says that "in order to end hostilities and facilitate the implementation of agreements," a "cease-fire on the spot" throughout the territory of Laos should be implemented by a cessation of bombing by the United States and "other foreign countries in the U.S. camp" and a halt to encroachments on each others' territories by the armed forces of Laos. The formulation on a cease-fire and bombing halt is reminiscent of a June 1971 NLHS proposal, but at that time they were made conditions for the opening of talks between the Lao parties.

Also included in the new point five are proposals regarding prisoner exchange and international supervision of the cease-fire which were not included in the former program. The new plan proposes that after the cease-fire the sides exchange "all captured militarymen and civilians of whatever nationalities" in pace with the withdrawal of U.S. and allied advisers and

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military personnel. It also proposes that an organ be set up to control and supervise the cease-fire and implementation of all agreements, with the assistance of the ICC.

24 OCTOBER SESSION At the 24 October session Phoune Sipraseuth forcefully reiterated the Pathet Lao position that the Vientiane government has departed from the path of neutrality, violated the tripartite agreements, and is no longer the Tripartite National Union Government set up in 1962. The United States and "its Lao henchmen the extremists" have "complotely scrapped" the Plain of Jars and Zurich tripartite agreements, he said, and have "completely overthrown" the tripartite government. He asserted that Vientiane's call upon the NLHS to return and take up its responsibilities in the government is "absolutely unacceptable." Thus, he pointed out, the problem "is not to restore a defunct government, but to set up an entirely new coalition government." He argued that the NLHS and the PNF are equal negotiating partners with the "Vientiane party" in talks on a Lao settlement.

Although Phoune Sipraseuth subjected the Vientiane government to prolonged, scathing criticism, he attacked Souvanna Phouma personally by name in only one relatively mild passage. He said that Souvanna Phouma has renounced the policy of peace and neutrality and declared the integration of his forces into the "rightist forces" and "considers himself the leader of this party." Thus, Phoune Sipraseuth added, today the "only genuine representative" of the neutralist party is the PNF.

Phoune Sipraseuth concluded by pointing out that the views of the two sides may "converge" on "some points," namely the reaffirmation by the Vientiane side of its commitment to honor the 1962 Geneva agreements. Asserting that that agreement "remains intact in its validity," he concluded that the "two key problems" to be solved are: "to end the war of aggression and military involvement of the United States in Laos and set up a new coalition government and the political consultative council."

MOSCOW, PEKING, Moscow and Peking as well as Hanoi have given
HANOI SUPPORT the NLHS some propaganda support. Hanoi media
 reported on the correspondence between the Lao
princes and on Phoune Sipraseuth's speech, and a 23 October
NHAN DAN commentary praised the NLHS' "just stand" at the
Vientiane talks.

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Peking media also reported on the progress of the princes' contacts and carried some Pathet Lao comment. NCNA on 21 October carried a lengthy summary of Phoune Sipraseuth's speech at the first session, including the text of the operative portion on the five points, but Peking has not yet been heard to comment.

Moscow also carried some brief reportage on the princes' correspondence, and on the 19th TASS briefly reported Phoune Sipraseuth's statement. There is no available Soviet comment on the statement so far, although Moscow had broadcast some low-level radio comment prior to the Vientiane meeting. A 10 October domestic service commentary had praised the preparations for the negotiations, expressing satisfaction over progress in the direction of a solution to the Lao problem. A Moscow radio commentary broadcast only in Lao on the 17th praised the NLHS' March 1970 program and expressed Soviet support for the Lao patriots' "just cause."

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SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT REITERATES REJECTION OF CEASE-FIRE

Unlike the Vietnamese communists and the Pathet Lao, Sihanouk's government (RGNU) has reiterated its intransigent opposition to negotiations, truculently stressing its rejection of the idea of a cease-fire in Cambodia. A statement by an RGNU spokesman carried by NCNA on 24 October, repeating Sihanouk's long-standing opposition to a cease-fire, was presumably prompted by a Khmer Republic Government statement--released in Phnom Penh on 19 October--which reviewed the regime's stand in favor of an Indochina cease-fire with the qualifier that it would be meaningful only if it were observed in all Indochinese countries. The government statement said that the cease-fire must be coupled with a withdrawal of all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from Cambodia, after which the Khmer people would solve among themselves the question of the "Khmer Reds." As for Sihanouk, it said that "the Khmer people consider him a thing of the past and his problem as being settled."

The RGNU spokesman's statement reviewed the military successes of the Cambodian liberation forces (CPNLAF), claiming that the Cambodian people and armed forces had launched vigorous offensives "on all fronts, around the capital, and in Phnom Penh itself." The people of the urban centers have risen up, said the statement, and "at this decisive stage" of the war the people and army "intend to liberate completely the beloved motherland and establish in Phnom Penh the FUNK and RGNU so as to make them administer the whole of Cambodia." The Cambodian people, the FUNK, and the RGNU, the statement continued, have repeatedly smashed the maneuvers of "the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys" for a "republic" "compromise," "negotiations," "fraudulent elections," "cease-fire on the spot," "division of Cambodia," and the like. But it warned that the United States continues to hatch plots and, in preparation for replacing Lon Nol with "other traitors," is again trying to bring about a cease-fire in place in Cambodia.

Reiterating the RGNU's categorical rejection of any cease-fire proposal, the statement added that the Cambodian question cannot be settled through any negotiations or "compromise between the FUNK and the Phnom Penh traitors." There can be a settlement, it asserted, only with the cessation of U.S. aggression, the "complete elimination" of the "Phnom Penh traitors with Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh as their chieftains," the complete liberation of Cambodian territory, and the placement of that territory under the sole administration of the FUNK and the RGNU, which will be definitively established in Phnom Penh."

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Intransigence was also exhibited in messages sent to Sihanouk and RGNU Premier Penn Nouth from RGNU Vice Premier Khieu Samphan, said to be leading the struggle in the Cambodian "liberated areas." Carried by the FUNK radio on the 21st and summarized by NCNA on the 23rd, the messages were dated 8 October and responded to an "appeal" issued by Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the 5th. The appeal had rejected all "maneuvers" for a cease-fire in Cambodia and called upon the people to step up their struggle against the U.S. "imperialists" and their "lackeys." Khieu Samphan again condemned the idea of a cease-fire in place and pledged that the people, FUNK, and CPNLA will carry on the fight "until total victory and the eventual, total liberation of Cambodia." On 22 October the FUNK radio carried one of Khieu Samphan's periodic appeals to monks, compatriots, cadres, and combatants to step up their offensives against the enemy. He expressed confidence that the people, the nation, and FUNK will continue the struggle "without compromise, negotiations, or cease-fire" until they drive out the U.S. "aggressors," destroy the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh "clique," and totally liberate Cambodia.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW EXHIBITS CONCERN OVER MILITARY BUILDUP ALLEGATIONS

In the past month Moscow has evinced sensitivity to U.S. press reports that the USSR and China are taking measures to cope with a possible military confrontation. In a 23 September PRAVDA article Georgiy Ratiani had taken sharp exception to assertions by Joseph Alsop that the USSR was planning a preventive attack against China.* In even more explicit terms, an article by Yu. Usov in the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 43) derides charges in the American press that the USSR is concentrating Soviet troops on China's borders as a "hackneyed lie."

Usov calls on "competent Chinese organs" to repudiate the Western contention that "missiles on launching pads in China are aimed at the USSR's vital centers--Vladivostok, the major cities of Siberia, and even Moscow and Leningrad." The article, summarized briefly by TASS on 18 October and reprinted on 19 October in the Moscow party organ MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, attacks "extreme rightist circles" in the United States and "imperialist propaganda" for attempting "to exacerbate Soviet-Chinese relations" by exploiting Peking's claim that the USSR will transfer "additional" Soviet forces to the Chinese border if an agreement to reduce armaments and troop levels in Europe is concluded.

Moscow has also expressed concern over Chinese weapons developments. The Prague trade union newspaper PRACE on 14 October published an article by NOVOSTI commentator V. Dobarin declaring that the Chinese nuclear armament program, "being implemented under the slogan 'Prepare for war,'" is an important manifestation of Peking's desire to become a great power capable of "dictating its conditions from a position of strength." He warned that Peking has already acquired "a substantial nuclear potential" and "is accelerating the production of missiles of various ranges." In a similar vein, the monthly INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 10, signed to press 21 September) published an article by V. Rybakov saying that in China "military preparations and a campaign of 'training for war' are in full swing."

* The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 16-17.

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These themes have been amplified in an article by A. P. Pamor in the third issue of PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST, the new organ of the Far East Research Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The article, signed to press on 25 August but not available until recently, maintained that because the army in China has been allowed to occupy a place in the country's public life "unprecedented in the history of socialism," it has been able to develop the military sector of the economy and the PLA has been equipped "with modern types of combat equipment, above all with nuclear missile weaponry."

The Usov article in NOVOYE VREMYA, similarly dwelling on Chinese aspirations to develop nuclear missilery, comments that PRC leaders are supporting a "united capitalist Europe" in the hope of winning allies who could further increase "China's military, including nuclear missile, potential." Soviet media have picked up reports of Chinese interest in drawing on Western experience in the use of nuclear energy, PRAVDA on 8 October quoting REUTER as saying Chinese nuclear experts had left Peking for the United Kingdom and the United States to familiarize themselves with the nuclear power industry. On the 17th NCNA reported that the vice rector of Tsinghua University was attending a Swiss international nuclear industries fair on industrial uses of nuclear energy.

Moscow radio broadcasts in Mandarin have elaborated on the theme of Peking's nuclear missile buildup. In talks on 2 and 3 October, Chinese listeners were told that their leaders were guilty of maintaining an "approving" silence on Western reports on "the number of missiles deployed along the Soviet-Chinese borders." One commentary alleged that the United States "would very much like to see a bloody clash between the peoples" of China and the USSR.

Although Moscow has reported the return to Peking on 17 October of its chief negotiator in the continuing border negotiations, neither side took notice of the third anniversary of the opening of the talks on 20 October. Previous anniversaries had also been ignored.

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K O R E A

NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS CONTINUE DESPITE MARTIAL LAW IN ROK

As indicated by its restrained reaction to ROK President Pak Chong-hui's proclamation of martial law on 17 October, Pyongyang has not allowed Pak's move to interfere with the continuation of North-South contacts. The third session of the full-dress Red Cross talks took place in Pyongyang on 24 October as agreed at the conclusion of the second session in Seoul on 14 September. And the South Korean delegation, which departed on the 26th, was feted in much the same way--with banquets, sightseeing tours, and the like--as during its first visit from 29 August to 2 September. Pyongyang devoted somewhat less propaganda fanfare to these events this time, presumably in keeping with the agreement that the first two meetings would be ceremonial and the subsequent ones devoted to substantive negotiations.

On 21 October Pyongyang and Seoul media issued a simultaneous announcement that the second session of the cochairmen of the North-South Coordinating Committee would be held in Pyongyang on 2 November and the third session in Seoul on 30 November. This higher-ranking forum for contacts, agreed upon in the 4 July North-South joint statement on reunification, was covered for the first time in Panmunjom on 12 October, attended by DPRK Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol and ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak.

Pyongyang's reaction to the proclamation of martial law in the ROK had been confined to scant, low-level reportage and comment--a clear contrast to its behavior after Pak's proclamation of a state of emergency on 6 December 1971, which prompted in quick succession a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on the 7th, a press conference by the director of the foreign ministry's information department on the 8th, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 9th. The December measures had been taken while working-level Red Cross talks were going on but predated the opening of full-dress talks and the higher-level political contacts which began last summer.

Pyongyang's first reaction to the martial law proclamation was an 18 October report that the "person in authority" in South Korea had committed an act of "unprecedented tyranny" with the avowed aim "of 'supporting' the dialog and peaceful reunification" but with the real aim of dampening the South Korean people's aspirations to peaceful reunification and intensifying suppression

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of their demands for democratic rights and freedoms. The report was carried by KCNA and the Pyongyang domestic service, and according to the 18 October KCNA press review, was frontpaged in the press. The clandestine "Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification" carried a similar report on the same day.

On 19 and 20 October KCNA carried reports of foreign comment, as well as a statement by "a South Korean opposition person" assessing Pak's move as an attempt to extend his rule and as having nothing to do with his assertion that the proclamation was necessary to back up North-South contacts. KCNA commented on the 20th that the "wholesale arrests" taking place in South Korea in connection with the proclamation show the isolation of the rulers from the people. The support of the people for independent, peaceful reunification "at a time when the Red Cross talks are going on, followed by the North-South joint statement," said the commentary, is shaking the U.S. "colonial rule" and deepening the "contradictions within the ruling group."

Pyongyang promptly signaled its interest in continuing the North-South contacts in comment immediately following the South Korean proclamation. Most notably, an article by Commentator in the party organ NODONG SINMUN on the 18th, carried by KCNA the same day, repeated Pyongyang's standard line on North-South contacts. Pegged to the 12 October meeting of the coordinating committee, the article criticized the ROK in stock terms for obstructing North-South contacts. It concluded with the reassertion that "we will continue to make all sincere efforts to implement the agreed points of the North-South joint statement and promote reunification," and it called upon the South Korean side to desist from its "double-faced tactics" and show "sincerity in practice."

TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT PAK	Pyongyang has not been heard to criticize Pak Chong-hui by name on its own authority since 8 October, restricting itself to attacks on the South Korean "person in authority." There was no deviation from this pattern in the reaction to the martial law proclamation, although the KCNA reports did quote third parties as naming Pak.
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Pyongyang had resumed direct personal criticism of Pak on 22 September, using such epithets as "traitor" and "villain," after having refrained from such attacks since the 4 July joint statement. The renewed personal attacks, confined to routine-level comment, appeared in the wake of an interview granted by Kim Il-song to the Japanese paper MAINICHI on 17 September in which he took "the South Korean authorities" to task for failing to implement the 4 July statement. The renewal of the personal attacks also coincided with the UN General Assembly vote to defer discussion of the Korean question. The attacks stopped on the eve of the 10 October announcement that the first meeting of the North-South Coordinating Committee would be held two days later in Panmunjom.

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CHILE

MOSCOW, HAVANA SEE FAILURE OF ANTI-REGIME CONSPIRACY

In extensive coverage of the crisis in Chile engendered by the nationwide strike of truckers and shopkeepers backed by the opposition political parties, Moscow and Havana now depict a situation in which the Allende government has gained the upper hand despite continuing tension. The media of both countries have linked the unrest to a conspiracy of the "U.S. imperialists" and domestic "reactionaries" bent on deposing the Chilean regime, noting repeatedly that the upheaval came after the Kennecott Copper Company had succeeded in obtaining an embargo on a shipment of Chilean copper to France.

While Moscow regularly accompanied its news coverage with commentaries on the evolving crisis, Havana exhibited a noticeable reluctance to go beyond the format of news reports. The Cuban circumspection may have been related to Castro's dismay last month over foreign press reports saying he had privately criticized Allende and had argued that the Chilean regime would have to abandon "bourgeois legality" if the revolution was to triumph. Although Castro vehemently denied the reports, they probably remain a source of embarrassment to him, and Cuban media may have been told to avoid comment that could be construed as meddling in Chilean internal affairs. In this context it seems noteworthy that the two Cuban commentaries on the Chilean situation monitored to date have both been in domestic media, while Havana's international broadcasts have confined themselves to news reports.

MOSCOW COMMENT Recent Soviet comment has portrayed an unsettled situation in Chile but one in which Allende has clearly scotched a rightist threat to his regime. A TASS dispatch from Santiago on the 24th typically observed that the political situation "remains tense and complicated" but concluded that it was becoming apparent that "the conspiracy of reactionary forces seeking to paralyze normal life in the country and, in a situation of chaos, to topple the Popular Unity Government" has failed.

Initial Soviet comment had stopped short of picturing an effort to unseat Allende. The early comment was typified by a 16 October radio commentary tracing the unrest chiefly to Chilean "reaction," said to be bent on undercutting Allende's program of social and economic reform. The broadcast said efforts to obstruct the

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transport of goods had "a political character" but did not suggest that a plot to oust Allende was involved. The notion that the survival of the regime was at stake was introduced in a radio commentary on the 18th: "Local reaction and U.S. imperialist circles . . . are seeking to effect a coup d'etat by disrupting the economic and political life of the country."

The foreign-domestic conspiracy theme has figured prominently in Moscow's comment, including prolific dispatches from correspondents in Santiago and radio commentaries beamed principally to Latin American and Soviet audiences. An article in PRAVDA on 24 October maintained that efforts of Chilean "reactionaries" to paralyze the country's economy was tied closely to "anti-Chile maneuvers of U.S. monopolies." Pointing to Kennecott's efforts to embargo Chilean copper shipments in Western Europe, the article concluded that the aim was "to support Chilean reaction in its attempts to prepare ground for a possible coup d'etat in Chile" and to bring about the return of nationalized Chilean enterprises "to the oligarchy and monopolies of the United States."

HAVANA COVERAGE PRENSA LATINA's extensive reportorial coverage over the past week has conveyed the impression that the government is in control of the situation and that the country is returning to normal. The two monitored domestic radio commentaries, both relatively innocuous, were in much the same vein. No comment has come so far from leading domestic television commentator Gomez Wanguemert, who frequently sets the line for comment on major international developments.

A domestic radio commentary on the 25th, expressing confidence that Chile will "emerge the winner" in the legal dispute with Kennecott now being decided by a Paris court, noted that the measures taken by Allende to cope with the domestic disorders had "foiled the openly coupist intentions of the ultrarightists and fascists." It observed that the regime enjoyed the backing of "the working masses and the students" and that consequently "the Day of Silence" called for by the opposition parties on the 24th had been a failure. "The people scorn the maneuvers of the reactionaries and imperialism," the commentary said, adding that "95 percent of the workers" reported to work and thereby demonstrated their support for the government. On the day Havana radio painted this optimistic picture for Cuban listeners, PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office reported to Havana that Allende's optimism notwithstanding, the "rightist opposition" was trying to "revive the conflict" and was fomenting more street demonstrations. The dispatch said that the prolonged

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strikes had seriously damaged Chile's economy and that while government countermeasures had diluted the impact of the strikes, they "have not provided a definitive solution."

An earlier commentary had been broadcast in the domestic radio service when the crisis was at its height. In a political information program for the Cuban armed forces on the 19th, Havana said the Allende government was facing "a new escalation" of the "campaign of aggression which Yankee imperialism and Chilean reactionary interests" have been waging. The broadcast cited Allende's remark that Chile was on the verge of civil war, but expressed optimism about the government's prospects for surmounting the crisis: "The energetic action of the masses in support of the Popular Unity government will halt the fascist outburst with which Yankee imperialism strives to overthrow President Allende's government and to again snatch from Chile the wealth which today belongs to the people." The broadcast linked the Kennecott embargo with the domestic upheaval, where Cuban comment on the embargo prior to the current crisis had indicated that it had served to solidify domestic support for the regime. Typifying the pre-crisis comment, a Havana TV commentator on 10 October concluded that Kennecott's action "had the unexpected virtue of uniting almost all Chileans, regardless of their political beliefs, in an angry attitude of protest."

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HUNGARY - USSR

PUBLICITY FOR "SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOPING" ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Fairly extensive Budapest coverage of the 19-20 October Moscow session of the Soviet-Hungarian Intergovernmental Economic and Technical-Scientific Commission, accompanied by comment on the "successful" growth of bilateral cooperation, contrasts with cool, cryptic reportage on the meeting of the same group in Budapest a year ago at a time of frictions on the issue of long-range economic cooperation.

An impasse had been publicly acknowledged by Premier Fock upon his return to Budapest after a late-March visit to Moscow. While the Hungarians still apparently have not been given what they want--long-range commitments on the delivery of Soviet raw materials to support Hungarian industrial development--the two sides have sought to paper over the discord since Fock's Moscow visit through a spate of bilateral party, governmental, and front organization contacts. Just prior to the latest meeting of the bilateral cooperation commission, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on 15 October carried an article debunking alleged Western ideas about a "Hungarian model" of socialism out of step with the precepts of Soviet experience.

Moscow has been more restrained than Budapest in its publicity for the bilateral contacts: It carried, as it did last year, only brief reports of the results of the 19-20 October commission meeting. On the 22d, however, the Moscow domestic service did report Hungarian Foreign Trade Minister Biro, in an interview with the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP, as saying that "Soviet-Hungarian economic cooperation is successfully developing" and that "during the first three quarters of the current year exports from our country to the USSR have grown by 21 percent."

The Budapest agency MTI on the 20th carried reports from its Moscow correspondent which included the text of the final communique and statements at the windup of the commission session by the two principals, Soviet Deputy Premier Lesechko and Hungarian Deputy Premier Valyi, who was in the Soviet capital also for a session of the CEMA Executive Committee. The communique, which said the talks were held in "a spirit of friendship and mutual comradely understanding," went into some detail about technical cooperation under the 1971 CEMA integration program but failed to record any progress toward solution of the impasse in the field of long-range

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economic cooperation. The document said only that the bilateral commission "was satisfied in being able to note that the volume of goods traffic has been flowing according to plan and rapidly growing between Hungary and the Soviet Union; the rate of growth in 1972 has been higher than in previous years."

The year-to-year character of the two countries' current economic cooperation was further underscored by Valyi's remark, at the ceremony for signing of the communique, that they were implementing the CEMA program by taking bilateral steps "year after year, half-year after half-year, along the road indicated." Valyi said vaguely that the "friendly but also businesslike" talks dealt with the two countries' economies--"from raw material needs to the delivery of finished products." He recalled Fock's troubled visit to Moscow in March in a bland observation that the present session's importance "was enhanced by the agreement reached earlier this year by Premiers Kosygin and Fock about the intensification of bilateral relations."

The USSR's Lesechko largely confined himself to the details of current bilateral cooperation and said the commission session had "promoted" the coordination of plans for 1976-1980. In restrained terms, Lesechko noted that current "reciprocal deliveries complied with the specifications for the period under review within the plan extending until 1975."

Brief Hungarian and Soviet reports on the 10-12 November 1971 Budapest session of the bilateral cooperation commission had noted that Lesechko met with Premier Fock while he was in the Hungarian capital. The developing difficulties were hinted at in a Budapest radio report, which noted that Lesechko "said he deemed his talks with Jeno Fock very useful" and added that "as a matter of fact, our premier made several interesting proposals to even further develop cooperation." But no communique on the 1971 commission session was publicized.

NEPSZABADSAG ARTICLE The article in the 15 October NEPSZABADSAG, by Tamas Palos, was keyed to no particular event or occasion. Aimed at discrediting alleged Western schemes to drive a wedge between Budapest and Moscow, it charged anticommunist forces with trying to propagate "national types" of socialism like "Russian" or "Hungarian" models with the purpose of fomenting "anti-Sovietism." It mentioned concepts of "democratic" or "human" socialism as well, without directly naming Czechoslovakia. Bourgeois propaganda, Palos contended, tries to minimize Soviet experience in building socialism and "deliberately misinterprets the resolution of

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the 10th congress" of the Hungarian party in November 1970, "according to which our party applies the internationally valid tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions prevailing in our country." He insisted that "our position is unequivocal in this respect: We reject the unfounded notions that have developed as regards a so-called Hungarian model."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

COLLECTION OF SUSLOV'S SPEECHES AND ARTICLES IS PUBLISHED

Apparently in connection with Suslov's 70th birthday on 21 November, the leadership has accorded him an unusual tribute by publishing a collection of his speeches and articles. Previously, Brezhnev had been the only Politburo member privileged to have such a collection published in Moscow. Following the publication of the Brezhnev collection in early 1970, former Ukrainian first secretary Shelest had a collection of his own speeches and articles published in the Ukraine in early 1971.

The announcement of the new collection, in PRAVDA on 21 October, depicted Suslov as an all-round leader. It disclosed that the collection covers the entire 30-year span of his career in leading posts and includes his statements on economics, culture, and party organization as well as on theory and foreign affairs. By contrast, the Brezhnev collection had merely covered the period since October 1964.

Pelshe and Mzhavanadze are the only other septuagenarians in the Politburo, and Mzhavanadze's retirement appears imminent. Mzhavanadze may have already ceased functioning as a Politburo candidate member since his resignation as Georgian first secretary in September: He was the only member of the 25-man leadership whose name was not listed in a 19 October obituary for a prominent academician.

CONSUMER GOODS OUTPUT LAGS DESPITE GOVERNMENT MEASURES

A Gosplan official has disclosed in the October issue of PLANNED ECONOMY that ministerial inaction forced the Central Committee and Council of Ministers to adopt a September 1971 decree on consumer goods production. The decree, designed to put teeth into the consumer goods program outlined in the five-year plan adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress, may also have provoked high-level controversy, judging from the warnings against consumerism by Masharov, Suslov, and Shelest in the summer and fall of 1971.

Despite the decree, the consumer sector of the economy has behaved sluggishly during the first nine months of this year in comparison with the same period last year, showing announced declines in growth

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rates in light industry from eight to three percent, in the food industry from five to four percent, and in consumer durables from 11 to 10 percent. To ensure implementation of the consumer goods program, the Gosplan official advocated restoration of Gosplan control over some consumer goods indices transferred to the jurisdiction of ministries and enterprises under the economic reform.

At the 24th CPSU Congress Brezhnev announced that consumer goods production would be expanded by having heavy industrial and defense plants undertake extensive sideline production of such goods and warned officials to cooperate in the new campaign. But by September, according to the PLANNED ECONOMY article, the failure of ministries to adopt measures to supply consumer goods in short supply led the Central Committee and Council of Ministers to adopt the 15 September 1971 decree "On Measures to Ensure the Further Development of Production of Goods of Mass Demand."

Although the decree, published in PRAVDA on 29 October 1971, was not addressed exclusively to heavy industry, its coercive features appeared directed mainly at heavy industrial enterprises. The decree set quotas for ministries on consumer goods production, made ministers personally responsible for plan fulfillment, made plant directors' bonuses dependent on fulfillment of quotas, forbade enterprises to reduce or halt consumer goods production without the consent of the Ministry of Trade, and ordered Gosplan and the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply to provide material needed to ensure fulfillment of the quotas and to allocate surplus resources primarily to consumer goods production.

Although the published decree and subsequent commentaries failed to mention any investments, the PLANNED ECONOMY article revealed that the decree had allocated capital investments and even foreign currency for the importation of equipment and material. The article did not, however, specify the magnitude of the investments or indicate whether they involved any change in the previously adopted levels of investment in the consumer goods sector. The published decree had merely called for raising output of "goods of mass demand"--including china and dishware, watches, motorcycles, cameras, electrical goods, and clothing--by 90 percent in 1971-75 as compared with the previous five-year plan.

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26 OCTOBER 1972

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HISTORICAL PLAY ON WRITER-REGIME RELATIONS ATTACKED

A new play treating the sensitive theme of relations between the writer and the regime has come under attack for overly favorable treatment of Tsar Nikolas I and for implicitly allowing parallels to be drawn between the tsarist and contemporary periods by approaching the theme from abstract rather than "class" positions. The play, "Steps of the Commander" by V. Korostylev, portrayed the attempts by the tsar to turn Pushkin into a pro-regime poet by using charm rather than coercion and Pushkin's attempt to maintain his independence.

In a 20 October MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA article entitled "In an Incorrect Light," leading theater critic Yuriy Zubkov rebuked Korostylev and the Vakhtangov theater, which staged the play, for "wittingly or unwittingly" deviating from historical truth by presenting Nikolas as an "intelligent, far-sighted, and refined" leader instead of a "tsar-gendarme" and for allowing him to express progressive ideas without fully exposing his hypocrisy. Zubkov wrote that the author was "speaking out against government infringement on the personal rights of a person and artist, against forceable government intrusion into the spiritual world of the poet, and against the forcing of Pushkin to accept alien and even hostile views and ideas." But Korostylev, in depicting only the "moral aspect" of the relationship, was said to have ignored the "class and social content of the conflict" between Nikolas and Pushkin and to have treated the theme in an abstract manner, thereby failing by implication to distinguish between the tsarist and Soviet regimes. The main reason for Pushkin's resistance to serving the regime, Zubkov maintained, was the fact that the tsarist regime was "based on social oppression." He went on to say that the tsar's arguments in support of the state's interests and his "attempts to draw the artist into the service of the authorities were not harmful in themselves" but were wrong because of the reactionary nature of the regime.

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